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Pure public goods are goods that fulfil two characteristics. It is not possible to exclude
anyone from using them (non-exclusive); and one person’s consumption of the good
does not diminish the amount of good available for others (non-rival). If exclusion is
either technically not feasible or is very costly, it is argued that such public goods will
not be supplied in efficient quantities by the market mechanism. Since exclusion is not
feasible, economic agents might as well wait for the good to be provided and then free-
ride. This is often given as justification for governments to provide the public goods and
finance their provision through coercive payment (taxation). In a well-known article,
Ronald Coase (1974) examined the case of lighthouses and pointed out that some public
goods are indeed produced by market mechanism.1 Until recently, discussion of public
goods provision in public finance text-books is limited to national or local public
goods.2 However, during the last few years, a number of important studies have
extended the concept of public goods to international context arguing that the so called
global public goods too would be under-supplied if left entirely to the private decision
of individual companies or governments. These studies propose that appropriate
institutional mechanisms and financing arrangements must be developed for providing
the GPGs (for example, many papers in Kaul et al. 1999; Sandler 1997; Barrett 2002).
This is one side of the story of GPGs.
A second (and somewhat controversial) side of the story of GPGs is linked with whether
aid (hereafter, ODA) could be used to finance GPGs (without asking whether it should).
Four related arguments could be seen. The first argument is that GPGs are crucial to
achieving the goals of development and hence, financing the provision of such GPGs is
considered to be a legitimate component of ODA (for example, World Bank 2001;
Kanbur  et al. 1999). A second argument appears to be based on the concept of
economies of scope. Instead of developing new mechanisms and institutions for
providing GPGs, the argument is that the existing multilateral institutions could take on
this role. A third line of argument is to see what portion of aid is already being spent on
GPGs anyway (fait accompli) and draw inferences and conclusions from that (for
example, Raffer  1999; te Velde et al.  2002). A fourth line of argument is that
publicising how some share of ODA is actually funding GPGs may help in improving
the image of ODA among the public in donor countries and in turn enable donor
governments and international organizations to increase aid.
Against this light, the aims of this paper are to examine the concept of GPGs; to identify
the various considerations in providing such GPGs and the resulting institutional design
issues for GPG provision; to summarize the various estimates of the extent of aid
presently being diverted to GPG provision; to examine whether the portion of aid
diverted for GPG provision predominantly flows towards some recipients; to consider
whether diverting aid to GPG provision is likely to crowd out aid for conventional
development activities; and finally to consider some arguments for and against the use
of aid for financing GPGs.
                                                
1 See Cowen (1992).
2 For instance, in textbooks such as Musgrave and Musgrave (1989), the word ‘international public
good’ or ‘global public good’ does not appear.2
2 Clarifying the concept of global public goods
In this section, a brief survey of the concept of global public goods is attempted. The
questions considered are: what is a GPG; what are its characteristics; what are the
various mechanisms in which such GPGs can be produced; and since the provision of
GPGs requires international cooperation, what are the conditions in which international
cooperation works and why.
2.1  GPGs and their characteristics
As in the case of national public goods (the classic example being that of national
defence), in the case of GPGs too, benefits must accrue to all global citizens. The
definition of GPG used by Kaul et al. (1999: 9) is on these lines and it asks the question
of who the beneficiaries are, i.e., the publicum. In their view, the global public can be in
terms of countries, socioeconomic groups and generations. They argue that a GPG
should: (i) cover more than one group of countries; (ii) benefit not only a broad
spectrum of countries but also a broad spectrum of the global population; (iii) meet the
needs of the present generations without jeopardizing those of the future generations. In
their view (1999:  11), a pure GPG is marked by universality, i.e., it benefits all
countries, all people and all generations; an impure GPG would tend towards
universality i.e., it would benefit more than one group of countries and would not
discriminate against any population segment or generations. Morrissey et al. (2002)
define an international public good (IPG) as a benefit providing utility that is available,
in principle, to everybody throughout the globe. They consider three types, namely,
those that directly provide utility, those that reduce risk (or disutility), and those that
enhance capacity.3
The Kaul et al. definition can be criticized for including a substantially normative
component based on the notion of sustainability. Many public ‘bads’ involving
irreversible decisions by current generations are GPGs even though they do not fulfil
the third requirement of Kaul et al. GPGs that span across generations are only a sub-set
of all GPGs. It is conceivable that some GPGs involve only the current generation.4 The
Morrissey  et al. definition can be criticized for limiting GPGs only to ‘utilitarian’
goods. For example, some GPGs may be important purely from intrinsic values and not
because they generate any utility to either existing or future generations. However, their
definition can be justified on the grounds that in the real world where important utility-
providing goods are being under-supplied, the question of seeking international
cooperation for intrinsic goods will be a long shot.
The above definitions suggest that to be considered a GPG, there must be a spill-over
effect beyond a nation’s boundary. GPGs can also be considered in terms of pure GPGs
(nonexcludable and nonrival); impure public goods (either partially excludable or
partially rival) including the club goods (Table 1).
                                                
3 Morrissey et al (2002:37) give various examples. IPGs providing direct utility include conservation of
biodiversity, protection of forests and lakes, peacekeeping, etc. IPGs providing risk reduction include
actions to reduce climatic risk (of global warming) or risk of financial instability;reducing acid rain,
and lowering the incidence of disease. Improving global governance institutions, knowledge
generation and research on arid agriculture are examples of IPGs of capacity enhancing type.
4  See Sandler (1999) for a discussion on intra- and inter-generational issues.3
Kanbur  et al. (1999:  53) also consider another category, namely, the joint products
(goods or activities that yield two or more outputs with varying degrees of publicness).
For example, actions taken by nations on private considerations (i.e., pure private
goods) could also bring benefits to other countries. We will return to examine why the
joint product approach to provision of GPGs is problematic.
Another important characteristic of GPGs can be whether it affects neighbouring
countries or several countries in a region or all countries globally. Kanbur et al. (1999)
refer to this as spatial range of spillovers. In addition to spatial spill-over, there could be
temporal spill-over of benefits (or costs) to future generations as well (for example,
Sandler 1999: 24-5; Kaul et al.1999). However, as already mentioned, it is not essential
that a GPG should involve temporal spillovers.
Table 1
A typology of global public goods (GPGs) based on their characteristics
Rivalrous Non-rivalrous
Excludable Pure private goods Impure public goods—network or club
goods:
•   transnational parks
•   INTELSAT
•   Canals, waterways
•   International space station
With some exclusion:
•   missile defence system
Non-excludable Impure public goods—congestible
goods:
•   alleviating acid rain
•   ocean fisheries
•   controlling organized crime
•   pest control
Pure public goods:
•   curbing global warming
•   basic research
•   limiting the spread of ‘infectious’
diseases
•   augmenting the ozone layer
•   some scientific discoveries and
knowledge
Source: Adapted from Kaul et al. (1999: 5) and Sandler (2002: 86).
2.2 Providing GPGs: the issue of technology of aggregation
The classic public goods provision problem is that once the good is provided, it is
available to everyone. Hence, citizens do not have an incentive to reveal their true
preferences but could wait for the good to be provided and then free-ride. This problem
applies to pure GPGs as well. According to Kaul et al. (1999: 450) there are three gaps
in global policymaking that leads to underprovision of GPGs: (i) a jurisdictional gap
due to discrepancy between global boundaries of major issues and essentially national
boundaries of policymaking; (ii) a participation gap due to international cooperation
being essentially inter-governmental even though many other stakeholders contribute to
GPGs; and (iii) an incentive gap as moral suasion alone is not enough for countries to
correct their international spillovers or to cooperate for GPGs. They recommend re-
engineering international cooperation to create a clear jurisdictional loop (coordinating
national, regional and global actions), a participation loop (bringing in governments,4
civil society, business and population groups) and an incentive loop (finding the right
incentive structure, offering financial incentives as well as international recognition as a
world leader).
Sandler (1998; 2001 and 2002) and Kanbur (2002) extend to GPGs Hirshleifer’s (1983)
approach of considering technology of aggregation (i.e., relationship between individual
contributions and the overall supply of the public good concerned). According to
Sandler (1998), technology of aggregation determines how best to provide different
GPGs and what kind of international action is needed. He considers four alternative
technologies for producing GPGs.5
a.  Summation: Each nation’s contribution to the public good adds to the overall
level of the good. This is expressed by:
                          n
Q = Σ   qi (1)
                               i=1
where Q is the total level of public good; qi is the contribution by country i.
Examples of summation technology include basic research and knowledge
generation of greenhouse gas emissions, protection of ocean species. In each of
these cases, the global level of the GPG depends on the contributions of all
nations. Sandler points out that summation technology results in agents not
cooperating if the benefits to individual agents exceed the cost in terms of
contribution. In the case of summation technology when voluntary contributions
are positive, the neutrality theorem applies. That is, ‘a unit contributed by
anyone has the same additional impact on the total provision, so that
contribution of one agent serves as a perfect substitute for that of another’
(Kanbur et al. 1999: 65).
b.  Weighted sum technology:  In this technology, the amount of public good
received by a nation is given by:
                          n
Q
i = Σ   α ijq
j (2)
                               j=1
where q
j is country j’s provision of the public good and α ij is the share of
country j’s provision received by country i. This technology seems to be better
suited to regional public goods which affect a few countries in a region (e.g.
European Union, NAFTA) or GPGs relevant to countries having some common
feature (tropical location, English language, shared history) than the whole
world. Sandler uses the acid rain problem as an example and points out that
when nation-specific private benefits are large enough, they motivate unilateral
action by nations to curb sulphur emissions.
                                                
5 See Appendix Table A1 for Arce M and Sandler’s presentation where examples of the four
technologies are presented for pure public goods, impure public goods, club goods and joint products.5






i is i’s contribution of the public good. Confronting a rogue nation or
finding a cure for AIDS or other viruses etc., are given as examples.






i is i’s contribution of the public good. Examples given are efforts to
curb the spread of infectious diseases, protection of tropical rain forests, control
of forest fires etc.
In the cases of the best shot and the weakest link technologies, the global level of the
GPG crucially hinges on actions of just one country. Global cooperation will still be
needed to identify such a country and decide whether there is a case for other countries
to share the cost of providing this good. In the case of summation technology, the
question is not of who should provide (as all nations need to contribute) but how to
ensure that all nations do contribute. In the case of weighted sum technology, the crucial
question is to decide which nations are relevant members.
2.3 GPGs as transnational externalities
From the discussions above, it is clear that GPGs are a class of cross-border spill-over
of externalities6 (Kanbur et al. 1999:  50). There is considerable literature on
international or transboundary environmental externalities (Mäler 1989; Barrett 1990;
Dasgupta et al. 1997; Folmer and von Mouche 2000). Many of these studies take a
game theoretic approach and attempt to identify conditions in which countries may or
may not cooperate with other countries to reduce the transnational pollutant. Using
repeated7 cooperative and non-cooperative games, the conditions in which cooperation
takes place and the correction of incentives are identified (Hardin 1982; Carraro and
Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1990 and 2001).
The Mitchell and Keilbach (2001) approach8 of international externalities may help in
clarifying which kind of externalities are GPGs. Symmetric externalities affect all
                                                
6 An externality is present when one agent’s utility or production function has real variables whose
values are chosen by other agents without any compensation to the loser/s (see Cornes and Sandler
1996).
7  In these, the interaction between two nations is modelled over a sequence of games where the
information matrix evolves to reflect a history of interaction and players may choose strategies in a
particular game taking into account the pay-offs in that game but also the opponent’s strategy in the
previous game/s.
8 Mitchell and Keilbach consider a simple framework of two nations; an international externality may
arise with either one or both being the perpetrator/s or producer/s and at least one of them being a
victim.6
nations9 (the example being an international lake from which both countries draw water
and to which one or both of them may deposit pollutants). Asymmetric externalities (the
example being an international river) tend to be unidirectional and mainly affect the
victims (i.e., the downstream countries). Mitchell and Keilbach (2001: 892) point out
that:
In symmetric externalities the fact that all states prefer mutual
cooperation to the status quo predisposes states toward narrow
institutions that rely on issue-specific reciprocity. Although coercion or
side payments could also be used to combat incentives to defect, such
linkage is usually unnecessary. Asymmetric externalities, however,
present more severe distribution and enforcement problems. An
institution limited to the single issue of an asymmetric externality would
provide benefits only to victims and impose costs only on perpetrators.
To create incentive-compatible institutions in the face of such
distributional problems, states dissatisfied with the status quo must
broaden institutional scope, using the linkage of incentives or coercion to
convince perpetrators to join the institution….
From this approach, they identify three mechanisms (or actions) available to states in
the context of externalities: issue-specific reciprocity (for symmetric externalities),
coercion or negative linkage (mainly for asymmetric externalities with strong or
powerful victim) and exchange or positive linkage (mainly for asymmetric externalities
with weak victims).
Barrett (1990) points out that in the case of a symmetric externality, each country must
choose its abatement level (or quantity of a public good) on the basis of marginal costs
and benefits of abatement (i.e., providing the GPG). The situation faced by a country is
depicted in Figure 1.10 In the absence of international action, each country will choose
abatement level of Q
0. When there is full cooperation, all countries will benefit from the
global public good and hence, will find it rational to abate up to Q
*. Barrett (1999: 198)
indicates that the larger the number of countries (N), the larger the gap between non-
cooperative and fully cooperative outcomes.11 Benefits from cooperation are large if the
                                                
9  Elsewhere, Mitchell and Keilbach (2001: 895) clarify: ‘Although the payoffs of mutual cooperation
are rarely evenly distributed, we consider these situations symmetric in the sense that all believe they
would benefit from mitigation of the externality, and all can either exacerbate or mitigate the problem
by engaging or not engaging in the behaviour generating the externality’.
10 Barrett’s figure concerns an international environmental issue. This seems to assume the summation
technology. In the case of the weighted sum technology, the slope of the MB curve will vary from
country to country. In the cases of the best shot and weakest link technologies, the global marginal
benefit curve and individual marginal benefit curve will coincide. A comparison will be made
between such benefit curves of different countries and the country which can produce a marginal
benefit curve farthest from the origin will be the best shot provider. In the case of the weakest link
technology, while there is a single marginal benefit curve, different countries may have different
marginal cost curves and the weakest link country will be the one whose marginal cost curve is the
steepest.
11 Barrett (1999) points out that in the case of issues with a considerably flat MCi and a steeper MBi,
substantial abatement will be undertaken by all countries unilaterally and cooperation may not
improve matters much. He argues (1999: 206) that in the case of ozone depletion, the rich countries
had a strong unilateral incentive to substantially reduce their emissions, whereas in the case of climate
change, the incentives to reduce GHG emissions may be much more muted. Murdoch and Sandler
(1997) also reach a similar conclusion about ozone depletion. Also see Sandler (1998: 236), who7
number of countries is sufficiently large (so that Σ  MBi = N*MBi is sufficiently large
compared to MBi); the marginal benefits from global action do not diminish quickly as
quantity is increased and the marginal costs do not rise steeply with quantity (see
Connolly and Munro  1999:  474). Barrett suggests that in the case of asymmetric
externalities, the asymmetry shrinks the difference between the non-cooperative and
fully cooperative outcomes. According to Barrett, to be successful, an international
treaty must be self-enforcing, i.e., countries must be free to choose whether to be a
signatory. The treaty negotiating diplomats may include rewards (carrots) for
compliance and threats of sanctions (sticks) for violators.
Figure 1
To cooperate or not to cooperate?
Source: Based on Barrett (1999: 199).
If there are substantial global benefits, is there a case for signatories to offer side
payments to non-signatories to join an international treaty (i.e., to produce GPGs)? This
issue is considered in Barrett (1990 and 2001). Side payments could be Pareto-
improving if global benefits are sufficiently large. By joining an agreement, a
developing country will have to increase its contribution to the GPG from Q
0 to Q
* with
the triangle KML representing the additional costs. So long as the additional benefits in
terms of the triangle JKL are in excess of KML, there is a case for side payments to
compensate the non-signatory country for the additional costs. Funding of
environmental expenditures by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is based on this
incremental cost approach. Heltberg and Nielsen (2000: 279) also use a similar
formulation as shown in Figure 1 to explain this. However, the important point is that
                                                                                                                                              
argues that if the proportion of nation-specific benefits to total benefits (from a transnational public
good) increases, the likelihood of national action increases.8
the GEF approach of financing incremental cost12 limits financial transfer to area KML
only. We will return to this issue in section 4.
2.4 Providing GPGs as a joint product
Foreign aid is considered to be an example of the provision of GPG as a joint product.
For example, aid to finance forest conservation or flood control measures, or improving
financial regulation or law enforcement in a developing country may generate global
benefits as a bye-product. Other examples of GPGs produced as joint products are:
−   Improving the quality of basic education (with implications in terms of the choices
made by a better-educated population about health, governance, human rights and
freedom of speech);
−   Research, development, innovations;
−   Vaccines, development of treatment techniques
−   Driving the advancement of technology; for example, the wide-spread use of
Internet communications by one country can encourage further research and
development to bring the costs down, which then benefits other countries.
Examples of joint products that include global public bads (i.e., where unilateral actions
by one nation may impose costs on other nations) are:
−   Pollution in terms of emissions into atmosphere, effluents into rivers and seas;
−   Energy use decisions (which apart from the pollution caused, may have
implications for sustainability and inter-generational fairness in case of non-
renewable sources);
−   Consumption of fertilizers or pesticides which can have both local as well as
distant impacts (depending on where the fertilizer is produced and where the
output is consumed); and
−   Lax regulation or weak enforcement which may lead to smuggling or terrorist
networks to emerge.
Figure 2 presents some scatter-plot graphs for eight different variables in relation to per
capita GDP of 1995 (from the World Development Indicators). The four diagrams in the
right-hand column are examples of variables relating to activities with potential positive
global impacts; those in the left-hand column are examples of variables relating to
activities with negative global impacts. In general, we find a positive relationship
between per capita GDP and the levels of activities with both positive and negative
impacts.13
                                                
12 See Mintzer (1993) for details on GEF’s incremental cost approach.
13 The relationship between income and water pollution is less straightforward. A regression equation
was estimated. The adjusted R square was 0.038. However, the parameter for log GDP per capita was
positive and significant (t-statistic of 2.134).9
Figure 2
GDP per capita 1995 (X-axis) and various indicators with GPG implications
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The problem with joint products is that these are incidental by-products of unilateral
decisions by nations. Should a nation be given credit for such actions or punished for
negative impacts? Nations could argue that on the one hand while their actions do
generate global public bads, their other actions (such as the ones on the right hand
column in Figure 2) generate global public goods, and these may, in the end,
compensate for the bads. Other nations are likely to demand remedial action in case of
negative externalities far more urgently than they are willing to complement for positive
externalities. The issue of the provision of GPGs as joint products is problematic from
an accountability point of view. Depending on a joint product approach to GPG
provision makes such provision highly vulnerable to private interests of nations and
whims of their electors. Since GPG provision is incidental, there is no guarantee that
donors and developing countries will accord high priority to what is essentially a
by-product. There could be a number of alternative ways to achieve the domestic policy
goal (for example, resources spent on education per pupil or level of pollution deemed
acceptable) and only some of them will have GPG as a joint product. Thus, in this
approach, it is entirely up to donors and developing countries to choose particular
alternatives and thus make ‘voluntary’ contribution to the provision of GPGs when it
suits them. If the provision of national and local public goods cannot be entirely left to
voluntary contributions, is it not problematic to depend on voluntary contributions for
providing equally crucial global public goods?
3 The design of institutions for GPG provision
Any arrangement for the provision of GPGs involves several questions: who provides
the good (with a further question of who should produce the good), who benefits from
the good, whether any exclusion can be applied, how the provider should be financed,
whether the beneficiaries can be expected to reveal their marginal willingness to pay for
the good, and if not, how the costs of providing the good can be best met. The fiscal
doctrine concerning pure public goods within a nation is to finance (pure) public goods
from general revenue. In the absence of a global government with tax raising powers,
voluntary cooperation and collective action are the main instruments to supply GPGs. In
Sandler’s (2001: 37) view, ‘financing does not pose insurmountable problems for many
IPGs’ (international public goods). He argues that institutional design depends crucially
on technology of aggregation: provision of pure and impure public goods by
international community; weakest link or best shot goods through public-private
partnership;14 club goods essentially through the development of private collectives that
fully finance the shared good through tolls. In the case of joint products, the relative size
of country-specific benefits determines whether coaxing is needed by international
community. Thus, the crucial element is that of the design of appropriate institutions. In
this regard, some key principles can be considered.
                                                
14 The concept of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ approaches to financing GPGs is related to this OED (2001: 25).
Traditional approach to public goods has been that of a ‘push’ model where the government or a lead
supplier bears the full financial risk and leads the provision of the good. In the ‘pull’ model, though
public sector still bears some responsibility, the private sector or other interested actors take the
initiative. See World Bank (2001: 120).11
3.1 Economies scope or subsidiarity?
Sandler (2001) notes that in practice, many supranational structures address more than a
single IPG due to economies of scope which suggests that the transaction costs of
organizing collective action may not necessarily increase with increased number of
activities (or GPGs) being supplied by a supranational organization. To benefit from
economies of scope, all relevant GPGs should be provided by a single organization.
An alternative conclusion comes from extending Olson’s (1969) concept of fiscal
equivalence. Kanbur et al. (1999: 54-5) emphasize the need for matching the geographic
coverage of the good’s benefits and the nations to be included in the collective, ‘unless
the decisionmaking body’s jurisdiction precisely matches the countries affected by the
public good’s benefits and costs, there is no assurance that good’s provision will
properly equate the requisite benefits to the associated costs’. They refer to this as the
subsidiarity principle. Sandler (2001: 25) points out that, ‘subsidiarity not only places
the problem on the most appropriate participants—those with most at stake—but it also
economizes on transaction cost’. Thus, subsidiarity principle implies that, ‘there should
be a plethora of supranational structures each of which corresponds to the relevant
economic domain of the underlying public good’ (Sandler 1998: 243).
Figure 3
An interpretation of the two tensions suggested by Kanbur (2001)
 for designing organizations to provide GPGs
According to Kanbur (2001: 6) the design of institutions for IPGs depends inter alia on
resolving two tensions, namely, one of ‘organizing [the supply of IPGs] as close as
possible to the beneficiaries, versus taking advantage of economies of scale’ and the12
other of ‘organizing supply along narrowly defined sectoral lines versus taking
advantage of the economies of scope’. Figure 3 is an attempt to graphically represent
these two tensions and the implications for institution design.
Until a global government or a global organization responsible for the provision of
GPGs emerges, the top-right quadrant may remain an enigma. Kaul et al. (1999) suggest
the formation of a global financing arrangement for providing GPGs, a GPG fund,15
distinct from ODA (which according to them is mainly focused on individual countries).
Such a fund, if established, would fall under top-right quadrant. There have been
demands for creation of global agencies focused on specific sectors.16 Such specialized
institutions would fall under the top-left quadrant.
The suggestion by Kanbur (2001) is to develop an organizational structure ‘which is
clustered around broad sectors, with groupings by regions within each sector’. He
argues that in the case of sectors having clear IPG or GPG properties, resources and aid
should be skewed in favour of sector agencies (the example he gives is that of WHO);
and to take advantage of the subsidiarity principle, resources and aid in other sectors
should be more heavily skewed towards regional institutions, such as regional
development banks. On this basis, it is suggested that aid should be channelled through
a ‘common pool’ mechanism (Kanbur et al. 1999: 86; Rajaraman and Kanbur 1999).
The institutional framework suggested by Kanbur would thus have several tiers with a
broad and loosely defined global organization (top right quadrant) with several sector
specialist organizations (top left quadrant) mainly to inform policy; followed by various
common pools developed at the regional level (bottom-right quadrant).
According to Kapur (2002), the crux of the problem in the common pool approach for
the provision of GPGs is not about rivalry of consumption within a GPG, but rivalry of
consumption among different GPGs in the absence of a ranking of GPGs. This, he
argues (2002: 349) results in the pursuit of private interests by donors in the guise of
GPGs. With regard to the role for regional organizations, critics argue that such regional
organizations are ‘more inefficient, slow and bureaucratic’ (Segasti and Bezanson 2001:
65). Making a distinction between global and regional public goods may be appropriate
when collective action is affected by group size or membership (due to transaction costs
of organizing collective action and distribution of costs and benefits: Sandler 1998;
Barrett 2001; also Ferroni 2002). Regional public goods are in some respects like
clubs—benefits mainly accrue to countries in the region. In the absence of a distinction
between GPG and RPG, donors are more likely to spend resources towards the latter.
For example, the DAC countries seem to contribute a lot more to European Commission
compared to their contributions to other global multilateral organizations.17
                                                
15 It must be reasoned that Kaul et al.’s suggestion is for global pool, not to be confused with another
fund of the same name, set up by the World Bank with an allocation of a budget of US$ 7.5 million in
2002 (OED 2001: 5).
16 For example, a number of authors have proposed the creation of a global environmental organization
(see Doyle and Massey 2000: 418; Lodefalk and Whalley 2002). Others argue that such organizations
will be effective only if issue-linkage is permitted so that developing countries receive other
incentives for taking actions to correct the externalities (for example, Jha et al. 2002).
17 For example, EC’s share of contributions by DAC countries to multilateral institutions increased from
16 per cent in 1983-84 to nearly 30 per cent by late 1990s.13
3.2 Further principles related to designing institutions
Sandler (1998: 238) considers five principles in designing institutions (or supranational
structures) for supply of GPGs. The first principle can be called collective rationality,
which requires that such structures must be instituted only when the aggregate net
benefits from collective action are positive for the group of potential participants. The
second principle corresponds to individual rationality i.e., there should also be net
positive benefits to each and every participating nation.18 The third principle can be
called issue-choice or jurisdiction in which the parameters of collective action should be
chosen so that the marginal benefits are equal to marginal costs for each such parameter.
The fourth principle can be called flexibility, where there should be scope to re-evaluate
and redesign the structure as circumstances change. The fifth principle is that of self-
enforcement  i.e., cooperation should be incentive-compatible so that participating
nations find it in their interest to cooperate.
Some of the above principles also resonate in the discussions in the field of international
regimes and institutional design19 (see Koremenos et al. 2001a and 2001b; Wendt
2001). The rational design of the international institutions project examined five design
considerations, namely: membership rules, the scope of issues covered, the degree of
centralization of tasks, rules for controlling the institution and flexibility of
arrangements (Koremenos et al. 2001a:  763). On the basis of various studies, they
summarize 16 hypotheses relating to the above five design issues of international
institutions (Koremenos et al. 2001b: 1055). They find that both membership of an
international regime and its scope increase with the severity of enforcement and the
severity of distribution (i.e., asymmetric externality) while scope and centralization
increase with number of participating countries, flexibility decreases with number.
This brief review seems to support Sandler’s (1998) assertion for a plethora of supra-
national institutions. It is possible that of the various principles discussed earlier, in
some cases economies of scale or economies of scope take precedence, which may
justify the development of formal organizations from an efficiency point of view. In
other cases, the subsidiarity principle may take precedence and the most appropriate
institution nearest to the level of required decisionmaking (for example, regional
development banks) could take the responsibility for delivering GPGs. Further research
is needed to clarify the question as to which principle should take precedence in
different circumstances. This may depend on the characteristics of the GPG and its
provision (i.e., suitable technology, monitoring costs, scope for self-enforcing
institution, number of countries, issue-linkage, side payment etc.), but other
considerations include participation, inequality and power-asymmetry.
                                                
18 It may be recalled from Figure 1 that in the case of GPGs, the global net benefits (i.e., the area
of triangle JKL depends on the slopes of global marginal benefits curve and the marginal cost of
abatement curve). According to Barrett (1994), an international agreement may achieve high degree
of cooperation only when the difference between global net benefits under the non-cooperative and
full cooperative outcomes is small (as in the case of Montreal Protocol, see Barrett 1999). He points
out that when this difference is large, a self-enforcing international agreement cannot support a large
number of countries. While Barrett’s focus has been on environmental agreements, these striking
results seem to suggest that caution needs to be exercised in designing institutions for the supply of
GPGs.
19 The institutional approach to regimes has been extended to the context of global environment. See, for
example, Young (1997); Haas et al. (1993); Keohane and Levy (1996); and Luterbacher and Sprintz
(2001).14
4 Using ODA to finance the provision of GPGs
The discussion in the previous section indicates the rich theoretical basis for designing
institutions for provision of GPGs. However, the empirical reality is that we seem to be
‘muddling through’, with various ad hoc arrangements to provide some GPGs, using
economies of scope in some cases and economies of scale in others. Many GPGs
including those related to international security, peace and development aid are joint
products of national decisions. Also, presently almost all financing for the provision of
GPGs is taking place as part of ODA. In this context, the following questions may be
considered: What extent of ODA is being diverted to finance GPG provision?; Does
such diversion skew ODA towards some countries?; Does spending on GPGs crowd out
aid for conventional development?; Should aid be used for financing GPG provision?;
Should developing countries receive side-payments in addition to ODA for any
contribution they make to GPGs?
4.1 The extent of ODA spent on GPG provision
Three studies which estimate what extent of ODA goes to finance the provision of
GPGs are reviewed here. These are by Raffer (1999), World Bank (2001) and te Velde
et al. (2002). These studies use the Credit Reporting System (CRS) data on ODA issued
by the OECD. These data are available in categories of up to 5-digit classification.
4.1.1 The extent of GPG financing from ODA
In one of the first studies to examine the extent of ODA allocated to GPGs, Raffer
(1999) defines GPGs in two ways—GPG-1 consisting of various activities which can be
judged from their CRS codes as having GPG character, and GPG-2 consisting of all the
above plus structural adjustment (510), action relating to debt relief (600) and
emergency assistance (all groups starting with 7). Raffer analyses data from 1973 to
1997. Data for selected years from his analysis are presented in Table 2.
Raffer estimates that ODA for GPGs is in the range of 3 to 14 billion dollars. He
observes that the share of GPGs in ODA increased significantly in the 1990s. He notes a
number of limitations of using the CRS data including the fact that CRS data includes
both commitments and disbursements as being synonymous.
Table 2
Financing of global public goods as a share of DAC aid to developing countries
Amount allocated in US$ millions As % of CRS total
Year
CRS (DC) total
in US$ millions GPG-1 GPG-2 GPG-1 GPG-2
1973 7940.8 646.3 786.4 8.14 9.90
1978 15568.4 1436.7 2400.8 9.23 15.42
1983 20844.6 2269.8 2931.6 10.89 14.06
1988 38340.1 4070.9 7073.0 10.62 18.45
1993 40347.3 7787.2 14713.3 19.30 36.47
1997 11917.7 3022.2 3166.5 25.36 26.57
Source: Raffer (1999: 11).15
4.1.2 Estimates of GPG financing from ODA
The World Bank (2001: 109) estimates that the extent of development assistance for the
production of global public goods (core activities) amounted to about US$5 billion
annually and another US$11 billion annually for complementary activities20 (Table 3).
The study notes that the level of funding for GPGs is significant in comparison with aid
flows of US$40 billion, excluding technical assistance or US$55 billion when technical
assistance is also included. The percentage of total ODA allocated to core activities of
IPGs increased from about 1 per cent in 1970s to about 8 per cent by 1999 (World Bank
2001: 117). Throughout the 1990s, a major share of global funding for IPGs has gone to
core and complementary activities in low-income countries (see Table 4).
In terms of sectors, in the 1970s, most of the resources were spent on health and
knowledge (agricultural and other research). Health sector remained the top recipient.
The shares of GPGs in different sectors as a percentage of total ODA in 1999 were
about 8 per cent for health, about 3 per cent for environment, about 4 per cent for
knowledge, and about 7 per cent for peace and security.
Table 3
Estimates of funding for core and complementary GPGs
Annual averages for 1994-98 in billions of US dollars
Global and regional funding Country-based finance
Foundations Trust funds Concessional Nonconcessional Total
Core activities 1 2 2 – 5
Complementary activities – – 8 3 11
Total 1 2 10 3 16
Source:  World Bank (2001: 112).
Table 4
Funding for IPGs:
Core and complementary activities in low- and middle-income countries
(given as percentage of total ODA)



















Core activities 2 1 2.5 1 4.5 3.5
Complementary activities 7 4 9 6 7.5 7.5
Total 9 5 11.5 7 12 11
Source: Based on World Bank (2001: 119).
                                                
20 These numbers, substantial as they are, are dwarfed by the figures of rescue packages for financial
crises such as Mexico (1995), Thailand (1997), Indonesia (1997 to 1999). For example, the rescue
package for Mexico alone was to the tune of 47.8 billion dollars (see World Bank 2001: 124). Though
such spending is country-oriented (with benefits excludable and rivalrous), it could be argued that
some spillovers from that spending are GPGs. Thus, the figures in Table 3 may be under-estimating
GPG financing.16
4.1.3 Estimates of GPG financing as per te Velde
te Velde et al. (2002) ask two questions, namely: How much aid has been allocated to
finance national public goods (NPG) and international public goods (IPG)? And second,
whether the increasing prominence of IPGs increased the share of aid allocated to public
goods? They find that the share of aid allocated to public goods has increased from
about 16 per cent in the early 1980s to about 38 per cent in the late 1990s (Table 5). It is
noted that a major share of this goes to finance NPGs which in the late 1990s accounted
for about 29.40 per cent of all aid. The share of aid to IPGs was about 5 per cent in the
early 1980s which slightly increased to nearly 7 per cent by early 1990s and to about 9
per cent by late 1990s.
te Velde et al. considered public goods under five categories/sectors, namely, the
environment, health, peacekeeping and conflict prevention, knowledge generation and
economic and financial governance, though they consider governance to be essentially a
NPG (Table 6).
There is a significant difference between the calculations of te Velde et al. and the
World Bank (2001). According to te Velde et al. (2002: 130), environment attracted the
greatest share (over 70 per cent) of aid allocated to IPGs. However, as per the World
Bank (2001), the share of environment in funds allocated to GPGs is fairly small (about
3 per cent). The main reason for this difference is due to the different definitions
adapted in these two studies.21
Table 5
Spending on IPGs and NPGs as a percentage of aid by all DAC donors
1980-82 1990-92 1996-98
International public goods 4.98 6.76 8.79
National public goods 11.24 21.67 29.40
Total 16.22 28.43 38.19
Source: te  Velde  et al. (2002: 126-8).
Table 6
Shares of funding for IPGs and NPGs going to different sectors
1980-82 1990-92 1996-98
IPGs Environment 78.30 80.70 70.50
Health 4.10 6.80 11.40
Peace 4.20 0.20 2.60
Knowledge 13.40 12.30 15.50
Source: te Velde et al. (2002: 133-6).
                                                
21 The definition of environment sector by te Velde et al. includes activities which were not included in
the World Bank (2001) definition, such as river development, waste management, water resources
policy, water resources protection, low-cost housing, housing policy, ocean power, and various
activities related to agriculture.17
4.2.4 Is the use of ODA for GPG provision skewed towards some countries?22
An attempt is made here to identify whether the use of ODA for GPG provision results
in substantial quantities of aid flows to particular countries, leading to a skewed
distribution of ODA. This is examined by using the OECD’s Credit Reporting System
(CRS) data for all recipients for the sample year of 1998. The analysis is limited to te
Velde et al.’s definition of IPGs. A summary is reported in Table 7. During that year,
the extent of ODA for GPGs in these four sectors23 was to the tune of US$3.3 billion.24
About US$2.8 billion of this amount was allocated to country-based programmes and
the rest to regional and global programmes.
About 90 per cent of the amount was allocated in the form of grants while the remaining
10 per cent was allocated either as concessional or non-concessional loans. This is
approximately similar to the ratio of grant and non-grant components of ODA. This
suggests that GPG financing is not any peculiarly skewed towards grant-financing as
compared to ODA in general.
Table 7
Summary statistics of recipients of ODA funding for GPGs, 1998
(amounts in US$ ‘000)









Over 100 million US$ 5 1,294,279 1,050,812 258,856 210,162
50 to 100 million US$ 6 424,631 393,725 70,772 65,621
20 to 30 million US$ 14 345,827 323,603 24,702 23,114
10 to 20 million US$ 19 260,675 247,074 13,720 13,004
30 to 50 million US$ 6 237,570 235,510 39,595 39,252
5 to 10 million US$ 21 160,175 157,681 7,627 7,509
1 to 5 million US$ 42 109,136 108,000 2,598 2,571
0.5 to 0.999 million US$ 11 7,871 7,871 716 716
<0.5 million US$ 32 5,791 5,791 181 181
Total- for all items
with data on
country allocation 156 2,845,955 2,530,066 18,243 16,218
ODA where country
Was unspecified 507,801 507,801
Total for all CRS 3,353,757 3,037,867
Source: Author’s calculations based on CRS data for 1998; OECD (2000).
                                                
22 Kaul et al. (1999: 495) suggest that the existing development finance system offers only the roles of
either a donor or a recipient, and urge that there is need for greater clarity and for expanding the
categories of actors.
23 The four sectors in which IPGs were considered by te Velde et al. include environment, health, peace
and knowledge.
24 This figure is much smaller than the World Bank (2001) figure of US$16 billion. Here only activities
defined to constitute IPG by te Velde et al. are considered, whereas the World Bank (2001) definition
covers many other activities some of which are classified as NPGs in te Velde et al.18
The top five recipient countries in terms of volume of ODA funding for IPGs were
China, Indonesia, India, Philippines and Bangladesh, each receiving over US$  100
million (1998) for IPG activities. However, compared to the recipient country’s GDP,
these amounts were not substantial.
Philippines and Indonesia received between 20 and 25 per cent of total ODA for
providing IPGs. However, for a large majority of the recipient countries, the share of
IPGs in ODA was very small—less than 5 per cent for 82 out of 132 countries analysed;
for another 21 countries, this was between 5 and 10 per cent of total ODA received.
Only for 12 countries, the share of ODA for IPGs constituted more than 20 per cent of
the ODA received in 1998. Of these, it formed over 50 per cent of ODA received for
Costa Rica and Jamaica, and this was between 40 to 50 per cent of ODA for Turkey,
Dominica and Maldives.25 Appendix 2 presents a breakdown of the amount of aid for
IPGs in terms of the four sectors and the top 5 recipients in each sector. Again, the share
of environment was well represented (as can be expected based on te Velde et al.’s
definition).
The figures above suggest that for 103 out of 132 recipients, the aid received for GPG
provision formed less than 10 per cent of total aid received by these countries, implying
that even though the share of aid spent on GPGs has been increasing, donors are not
allocating those resources any differently than they allocate the rest of the aid.
4.1.5 Summary: the extent of ODA on GPGs
From the foregoing discussion, we have different estimates of the extent of ODA that is
diverted to finance GPGs. These are summarized in Table 8. The wide variation is due
to the different definitions that one could adapt as to what is an IPG or GPG.
Table 8




GPG or IPG provision
as a share of ODA, %
Raffer (1999) 1997 25.30
World Bank (2001) Late 1990s US$5 billion out of US$40 billion of aid 12.50
te Velde et al. (2002) 1996-98 8.79
Author’s estimates 1998 US$3.3 billion compared to aid of US$88.8 billion 3.72
4.2 Does diversion of ODA for GPG provision crowd-out aid for conventional
development?
To examine the question of whether spending on public goods has taken away from
other forms of aid, te Velde et al. estimate various regression equations using first
differences based on data for the periods of 1980-82, 1985-87, 1990-92 and 1996-98.
Their findings from the various regression results indicate that (i) an increase in the
share of aid allocated to IPGs is not associated with a rise in ODA to GDP ratio;
                                                
25 There is an anomaly in case of Mexico where the amount of ODA for IPGs is 178 per cent of its total
ODA.19
(ii) donors who allocate more aid to IPGs also tend to allocate more of their GDP to aid
(i.e., generous donors); (iii) spending on IPGs tends to displace other aid spending, and
(iv) increased spending on IPGs has not displaced aid from complementary NPGs, but
probably from other activities producing benefits that are private goods in nature.
In conclusion, te Velde et al argue that the ‘future increases in spending on IPGs in
developing countries should not come from further increasing the share of aid allocated
to this purpose’ (2002: 152). They suggest that either the value (quantity?) of aid should
be increased or sources of funding other than aid should be found for IPGs.
An alternative exploration of the question of whether GPG provision crowds-out aid to
conventional development is attempted by examining the relationship between the
contributions that donors make to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and Montreal
Protocol Fund (MPF) in year t and the remainder of the increase in multilateral ODA
between years t and t-1. The following equation is estimated:
∆ MULTIODA t, t-1 = a + b*(GEF+MPF) t
The results for the years between 1997 and 2000 are shown in Table 9.
In the regression results for two out of three years and the pooled regression results for
the entire period, the independent variable has a negative sign. This suggests that
allocation of ODA for providing GPGs such as GEF and MPF diminishes the resources
available for other multilateral ODA. This by itself is not a test of crowding out
hypothesis but it is in line with such a hypothesis.
Table 9
Does contribution to GEF and Montreal Protocol Fund crowd out other multilateral contributions?
Regression estimates
Constant Parameter of (GEF+MPF)t Adjusted R Square






















Note: Figures in brackets are t-statistics.
Source: Author’s calculations.
4.3 Should aid be diverted to finance GPGs?
The existing system of financing GPGs makes no distinction between GPGs and other
development activities. This no distinction viewpoint seems to assume that all GPGs
could be supplied by expanding and restructuring the role of existing multilateral
organizations (such as the World Bank, UNEP and UNDP, etc.) and financing such
GPGs through ODA. However, such diversion of ODA for GPGs can be criticized as
being (i) unethical, as diverting ODA to GPGs diminishes resources available for the20
primary purpose of ODA, namely, poverty reduction priorities and development of poor
countries; (ii) inefficient, as institutions and knowledge developed for development may
not be the most appropriate ones for delivering GPGs; (iii) unaccountable, as such
funding of GPGs takes place on an ad hoc basis and unrelated to any assessment of
requirements and priorities; (iv) myopic, as it may be mainly influenced by the
perceptions of current generation.
While there is a case for making a distinction between ODA and the financing of GPGs,
two viewpoints are possible. Under the strong distinction approach, we need to delink
the financing of GPGs from ODA straight  away by creating an altogether different
institution to provide GPGs and to finance them from separate sources other than ODA.
Under the weak distinction approach, some GPGs may have to be provided by new
global organization/s while other GPGs, which are joint-products and relevant to
poverty reduction goals, can be provided through existing channels and financed via
ODA.
Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages as shown in Table 10.
We have already argued above that the existing approach of diverting aid for GPG
provision is riddled with philosophical and procedural problems. In spite of these
problems, why do donors continue to divert resources to finance GPG provision? GPGs
cover important issues, some of which generate favourable public opinion amongst the
public in donor countries. Besides, no one seems to object to such diversion; many
GPGs lack champions and this gives donors a chance to appropriate important causes to
champion, at a time when their moral high ground has come under question in western
societies (as seen in the globalization protests in Seattle and Prague). There is a critical
need to break away with this ‘practice of convenience’.
From the discussion of institutional design principles in the previous section, it was seen
that a ‘plethora’ of institutions may be needed to provide GPGs. While the weak-
distinction version is a compromise, it may be relevant only as a short-term solution. In
the long run, there is need to delink the financing of GPG provision completely from
ODA which should focus only on the purpose for which it was originally created, i.e.,
poverty reduction and promotion of development.
Table 10
Comparison of the three approaches to financing of GPGs
Strong distinction Weak distinction No distinction
Creating a clear champion for GPGs High Moderate None
Use of economies of scope High Moderate Moderate/some
Use of subsidiarity principle Moderate High Moderate/some
Flexibility to craft and adapt a range
of institutions
Moderate High Moderate
Dependence on a new international
agreement (hence, preparation costs)
High Moderate None
Administrative and transaction costs
of creating institutions
High Moderate/some None21
4.4 How does current funding of GPGs compare with the requirement/demand?
From the present statistics, we only know that a total of about US$16 billion is allocated
by donors for GPGs. We do know that only some GPGs are provided and it is quite
possible that many other important GPGs remain under-provided or not provided at all.
There is a dearth of estimates of the magnitude of funds required to provide GPGs to
ascertain adequacy (Development Committee 2001: 8). As highlighted by the high level
panel constituted by the UN Secretary-General, it was estimated that compared to the
about US$5 billion allocated to GPGs, annual requirement may be of the order of
US$20 billion (Zedillo et al. 2001: 71) i.e., a four-fold increase. Even this is likely to be
a conservative estimate.
4.5 Financing the provision of GPGs
The discussion in section 3 indicates that the main problem is likely to be that of
financing GPGs of pure public goods nature. Sandler’s analysis (discussed earlier)
suggests that where exclusion is possible, clubs will emerge to supply such GPGs
(example being, NATO, other military alliances, international space station). From the
viewpoint of technology, the most problematic ones are those that are of summation
technology and weakest technology. In the case of the former, contributions are needed
by every nation. In the case of the latter, a consensus is needed to transfer resources to
the ‘weakest link’ country. In case of GPGs requiring weighted sum technology, their
location seems to be crucial. Problems affecting regions with sufficient self-interest to
donors (for example, European Union or NAFTA), the weighted sum technology will
work. In case of problems that require action by several poor countries, for example in
South Asia or Sub-Saharan Africa, the weighted sum technology by itself is unlikely to
work unless aid is given. Thus, the priorities for global action are fairly clear.
Should developing countries be subsidized for providing GPGs? As we saw earlier,
many developing countries receive a small portion of aid for GPG provision. As already
mentioned, this is an ad hoc approach and is likely to lead to crowding out of aid for
conventional development purposes. The various arguments considered earlier suggest
that GPGs should be financed independently of aid. The discussion from Barrett’s
analysis of self-enforcing international agreements provides a basis for determining the
extent of transfers to be made to non-signatories. When developing countries are
signatories to an international treaty, and when their country-specific benefits are
themselves significant, Barrett’s analysis directly applies. When developing countries
are not signatories, obviously, side payments will be needed to cover any costs incurred
by them in the provision of GPGs. When developing countries are signatories but their
country-specific benefits are fairly small as compared to country-specific benefits for
other (richer) signatories, the analysis can be extended by considering developing
countries to be in the same situation as nonsignatories and identifying the extent of side-
payments.
Apart from the area KML in Barrett’s diagram (Figure 1), developing countries may
need to be given aid to cover some of the administrative costs of producing GPGs.
These are expenses for developing the necessary institutional capacity (some
complementary activities). Hence, for a global agreement to work, the net additional
benefits to a global community (i.e., area JKL) should be sufficiently larger than the22
incremental cost to the developing country (i.e., area KML) plus some or all of the
servicing costs of developing the institutional capacity.26
5 Conclusions
The provision of global public goods remains an important governance-challenge. As
we continue to ‘muddle through’ with only ad hoc arrangements for the provision of
GPGs, many such GPGs will remain under-provided. There is a rich literature on what
kind of institutions are appropriate for providing different GPGs; how such institutions
must be designed; when international agreements are likely to emerge and when they
are likely to be successful. At present, the provision of GPGs is mainly financed by
diverting ODA. There is considerable variation in different estimates of the extent of
ODA so diverted, but it is in the range of 3 per cent to 25 per cent. Using aid for
activities which generate GPGs as joint products may appear as a cost-less way of
generating GPGs. However, several problems in this regard were discussed in the paper.
These include the lack of accountability, the susceptibility to whims of political waves
in the donor countries, difficulty in determining whether positive joint products are
more than offset by negative joint products, and so on. If aid should not be used for
financing the provision of GPGs, what are the other sources? From the preceding
discussion, the following financing priorities can be identified:
i)  For GPGs of pure public good variety, institutions in the form of international
treaties and regimes need to be developed. In the short run, such treaties and
institutions are likely to remain issue-specific based on specialization rather
than economies of scope.
ii)  GPGs amenable to the weighted sum technology that are particularly relevant
to the needs of developing countries are likely to remain under-supplied. The
priority for global action in this regard is to facilitate the development of
robust, yet flexible regional institutions which can provide such GPGs
effectively.
iii)  In the case of GPGs which are amenable to the best shot or the weakest link
technology, the priority for global action is to develop institutions which can
identify the most efficient way of providing the GPG, coordinate global
contributions and channel these resources to the relevant country and be able to
hold that country accountable.
Institutions for GPG provision need to be designed on the basis of the various principles
of economies of scale, economies of scope, (economies of) specialization and
subsidiarity. There is a need for further analysis to determine which kind of institutional
arrangement is the most efficient way to deliver which set of GPGs. This requires work
on how the different principles interact and how the relative balance of underlying
policy variables changes. In the absence of a global government with tax-raising
                                                
26 If these additional costs are also taken into account, the MC curve should be steeper than the MC
shown in Figure 1. Taking those into account, the true optimum quantity of GPGs may be lower than
Q*.23
powers, voluntary cooperation and building of global or regional coalitions is necessary.
Initially, we may need to develop several specialist institutions. However, by using
consistent and similar organization design principles, membership and accountability
requirements, we could design these individual institutions so that over a period of time
they could move towards a single international organization as a collective (moving
from top left quadrant to top right quadrant in Figure 3).Appendix Table A1
Technology of aggregation and category of public goods
Aggregation technology Pure public Impure public Club Joint product
Summation
Overall level of public good equals the sum











Preservation of rain forests
Weighted sum
Each agent’s contribution can have a different
additive impact on the overall level
Reducing ambient pollutants









The smallest effort determines the public good
level
Inhibiting the spread of pests
Labour standards








The largest effort determines the public good
level






Quelling of a flare up by
peacekeepers
Bioprospecting
Source:  Arce M and Sandler (2002: 21).
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4Appendix Table A2
The amount of aid for IPGs: Sector-wise total and top 5 recipients, 1998
IPG sector Total ODA for IPGs Of which, grants ODA for IPGs for the country Of which grant for the country
(amounts in US$ ‘000) Top 5 recipients in the sector (amounts in US$ ‘000)









Burkina Faso 5,684 5,684










Note: The sectors—environment, health, knowledge and peace—are based on definitions of these sectors te Velde et al. (2002).
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